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I. Introduction
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter CFSP) has been developed through 
different stages. All those stages had one thing in common; this policy was legal, foreseen by 
the treaties and aiming to establish a new chapter in the “fairytale” of the European Union. 
However in this paper another aspect of this policy will be discussed, how legitimate this 
policy is. Without a deep analysis one could say that if it’s legal then it’s legitimate as well, 
but it has been proved through the history of international law that legitimacy means 
something more than foreseen in treaties, more than being legally correct. After all, laws are 
made to serve the people because “when laws serve only themselves, there is a lack of 
legitimacy”1. Therefore legitimacy goes to another level; it makes sure that the laws serve 
their purpose, which is to improve the life of the people.
So when talking about legitimacy, another criterion comes into the scene, morality, the 
common good, what people that those laws govern want. ”Legitimacy serves to support and, 
when necessary, to correct legality” since after all, laws remain how they are in paper and 
legitimacy is fluid and changing.2 CFSP is a legal policy, foreseen by the treaties and with a 
regulated framework; however it remains to be seen if the whole process is any legitimate 
considering that “legitimate decisions are based in democratic participation whereby affected 
persons have the opportunity to raise their voices.”3 The process of decision making in CFSP 
leaves place for improvement. The voice of the people is barely heard, considering that it is a 
basic rule of democracy that through parliamentary procedures people shall be part of the 
decision making process. But when it comes to the EU, especially to CFSP, the procedures
are quite complicated and lack that piece of a democratic process. 
Considering the importance of Parliaments on the abovementioned democratic processes, the 
EU Parliament should be understood as a key institution that will introduce the possibility of 
turning the EU system into an ordinary democratic system.4 However the low turnout of the 
election in the European Parliament should not come as a surprise.   “Low levels of attention 
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within political parties and by the media, in part due to institutional factors, generally reduce 
the popularity of what are often called ‘second-order elections’.”5
The EU has started as a different organizational structure but historical developments have 
had an impact on the importance of the EU as an active actor in the international scene. Its 
role should be enhanced and EU should not rely anymore in powers of the USA in cases of 
international crisis but take its own steps. However, the role of the 28 Member States when it 
comes to deciding in engaging in these crises is not very substantive. After all what is the EU 
fighting for, world peace? Is it turning in a Don Quixote fighting the wind mills, fighting for
“its commitment to the defense of causes in which it rarely has a direct stake?”6
In this paper I will attempt to describe the background of the CFSP, including a brief 
historical overview, and afterwards I will try to describe the decision making procedures and 
the role of each of the EU actors in the foreign policy making of the EU, which will lead us to 
the point of how participating this policy is, how is developed in practice and its external 
difficulties such as the overlap of powers with NATO and the relation with the US.
II. Historical background of  CFSP
The idea of establishing cooperation on the field of foreign and security policy emerged as a 
matter of political changes of the time. After the bloody events of the Second World War, EU 
had to make sure that this kind of conflicts would not be repeated in the heart of Europe and 
the upcoming Cold War was not helping these fears. 
The first attempt to create common positions between the main European states on the field 
of defense and security was noted with the European Defense Community (hereinafter EDC). 
This came as a result of a “French initiative to make German rearmament acceptable within 
the framework of an integrated European military force.”7  The proposal of involving the 
German military power in an integrated European army under supranational control brought 
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the idea of creating the EDC. 8 Nevertheless the idea of rearming Germany was quite 
frightening for the rest of Europe and especially for France but after all this seemed like a 
better idea since having under control German soldiers would be much better than leaving 
them out of sight. In October 1950, the French proposed the Pleven Plan under which 
military forces from all the Member States would be integrated into a European army, which
would be managed by a European Minister for Defense, who would be controlled by the 
Council of Member States.9 The EDC was signed in Paris on 27 May 1952 by the six 
founding members with the aim of setting a common foreign policy. However, the EDC 
project was unsuccessful after the French National Assembly failed to ratify it in 1954.10
On the other hand there was a positive outcome from the failed EDC. In 1954, the Western 
European Union was created hence a European Defense Organization was born. “Thus the 
unofficial intention connected with the creation of the WEU was to take over the envisioned 
role of the failed EDC and to control a rearmed Germany”.11
It was certainly within the common interest of the six founding Member States to have 
common standings regarding different issues tackled by foreign policy. Therefore in 1972, in 
the Hague summit, a system of cooperation in foreign affairs or so called “the European 
Political Cooperation” (hereinafter EPC) was established. This was a quasi-institutional 
mechanism governed by rules of international law and it was aiming to facilitate “the 
economic integration objectives laid down in the EC treaties”.12 EPC was considered as a 
“deliberately vague name that both masked that EPC was about foreign policy cooperation 
and also symbolized the political sensitivities attached to moving into a policy area so 
associated with national identities and sovereignties”13 However this system of cooperation 
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had no legal background and it developed through traditional diplomatic and economic 
actions. 14
Historical dynamics brought the need for a stronger voice of Europe either within its territory 
or in the international scene. The urge to reconsider the EPC provisions emerged since a 
European Community without a common defense policy was seen as incomplete.15
A treaty base for these matters was provided after the entry into force of the Single European 
Act in February of 1986. In Title III of this act “Treaty provisions on European co-operation 
in the sphere of foreign policy were provided”.  Even that there is a lack of an obligatory 
vocabulary towards the Member States in this title, a progress still might be noticed and as an 
innovation, a secretariat was located. The contracting parties were encouraged to follow an 
informal cooperation consisting of consultations and take into consideration the position of 
each other when taking an attitude. Another important novelty that came out of this act was 
an institutional one, the European Council was formally involved in the institutional system 
of the treaties, a Presidency for the European Political Cooperation was established, and a 
Secretariat was created with the aim of assisting the European Political Cooperation to 
prepare and implement its activities.16
The attempt to create a foreign policy through the European Political Cooperation seemed 
irrelevant next to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO), since it was 
NATO that was tackling the main issues of the foreign policy at the time. Furthermore, the 
success or the initiatives of an EU foreign policy were not always dependent only on its 
forces to survive but also on the appropriateness of these initiatives and their impact on 
transatlantic relations.17
When talking about the historical dimension of CFSP one should look in the beginning of the 
90’s when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed. The Treaty of Maastricht has an utmost 
importance on the whole chronological story of the European Union; it was by this treaty that 
the contracting parties established what we call nowadays the European Union. Furthermore, 
with the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on the European Union - TEU) a new milestone was set 
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on the EU as an active player in the field of Foreign and Security Policy.18 By this Treaty a 
single institutional framework complied of three pillars was determined: first pillar or the 
European Communities, the second pillar or the Common Security and Defense Policy and 
the third pillar Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters.  Another important
stepping stone were the (legally binding) provisions in Title V of the Treaty where a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy was established. The aims of the common foreign and 
security policy might be seen from two perspectives: safeguarding the common values of the 
Union, preserving peace, promoting cooperation, consultation and implementing join actions 
in areas of common interest for Member States,- meanwhile a commitment to respect 
international law is also noted with the objectives of preserving and strengthening 
international security, encouraging international cooperation, respecting and enhancing 
democracy, rule of law and fundamental freedoms.19
Beside setting the legal basis for developing a common foreign and security policy, the 
Treaty of Maastricht also defined the competences of each of the institutions regarding this 
field. Article J8 of the Treaty provides the European Council with the power of defining and 
implementing the common foreign and security policy meanwhile the Council shall take the 
necessary decisions for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy 
while ensuring unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. At the same time 
the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the field. The European 
Parliament was defined more as a consolatory body and the Presidency needs to ensure that 
its views are taken duly into consideration; also the Parliament might ask questions to the 
Council or make recommendations.
Considering that the role of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice are quite limited, in one way or another Member States insisted to 
keep their powers regarding this field in an intergovernmental approach.   
Even that in the Treaty of Maastricht a commitment was shown by the Member States to 
develop a common security and defense policy and the “treaty basis” was provided; many 
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challenges had to be prevailed in order to have an effective policy. “Dubious states such as 
Great Britain wished to deny the EU a significant role in the security and defense field.”20
With the purpose of improving consistency and coordination on the field of foreign policy, in 
1997 the Amsterdam Treaty was signed and even that it produced a number of important 
changes, “it still saved the pillar structure set in Maastricht”.21 These changes consisted 
mostly of procedural ones but also a new post of the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy was created and headed by Javier Solana, who already had been 
experienced as a Secretary General of NATO. This answered the “who is in charge problem” 
or as Henry Kissinger had supposedly put it- “who do I call if I want to call Europe?”22.  
As regards procedural changes, three voting procedures were envisaged for the Council: 
unanimity, qualified majority voting and majority. Furthermore, the Council was provided 
with a new instrument, the task of laying down guidelines and adopting “common strategies” 
that will be used to implement foreign policy goals (who can be taken by qualified majority 
voting). Also, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced enhanced cooperation “that allowed groups 
to advance in a specific area without the consensus of all EU members”.23 Moreover worth’s 
mentioning that just like its predecessor, the Treaty of Amsterdam also did not contain 
provisions regarding legal remedies that would allow the Court of Justice to review the 
legality of CFSP measures, except when they affected the EC Treaties.24
“Article J. 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which amends the Treaty on European Union, 
establishes that the Western European Union shall provide the European Union with access 
to an operational capability for 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.25 Meaning that with 
the effort to enhance operational capabilities of EU, operational tasks were delegated to a 
newly establishment organization: Western European Union. These tasks are commonly 
known as Petersberg operations deriving from the Petersberg declaration and involve 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks and tasks of combat 
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forces in crisis.” The mechanism for decision-making as regards Petersberg tasks involves 
cooperation between the European Council, the Council and WEU Council of Ministers.26
The foundations of what we perceive nowadays as a Common Security and Defense Policy 
were laid in December 1998 when the British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed in a meeting 
with President Jacques Chirac in St. Malo that “the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.27
The Saint Malo declaration was a stepping stone on the CFSP policy. It was this moment 
when France and UK decided to leave behind their contradictions and unite in this policy, 
making its development possible. This declaration initiated a new political process and it 
contained the following key points:
I. The EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage... making 
sure of achieving full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP;
II. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises;
III. Setting the rules of CFSP relations with NATO thus stating that the different situations of 
countries in relation to NATO must be respected and in order for the European Union to take 
decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, 
the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, 
sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary 
duplication...
IV. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks and for 
this purpose the states readiness to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give 
concrete expression to these objectives.
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Further amendments to the provisions of CFSP were achieved by the Treaty of Nice in 2001. 
Some of the main changes were the possibility of the Member States to establish among them 
enhanced cooperation, with the aim of safeguarding values and interests of the Union as a 
whole. Furthermore, the rule of qualified majority voting now was reinforced, also being part 
of the procedures for the appointment of the special representatives. The Western European 
Union was abolished and consequently EU had been given the direct responsibility to frame 
the defense aspects of CFSP and providing access to an operational capacity.28 However, 
until the end of the century there was a lack of concrete provisions that would grant the EU a 
solid framework of crisis management capabilities. 
As it can be seen, “the creation of the foreign policy of EU, just like the creation of the EU as 
a whole, is not a single event out of the blue, but a result of different interrelated historical 
developments such as a political European trend to complement economic power with 
military power, dissatisfaction with the political relations with the Transatlantic Alliance and 
the failure of the EU to adequately prevent control, and solve the conflicts in Yugoslavia.”29
It was the bloody wars that occurred within the natural borders of Europe that pushed these 
events further and further, and raised the awareness for the need to have a proper defense 
plan within the European Union.  Throughout the years the EU was trying to develop a 
standing role as a global actor, and it has managed to do so, even that maybe not so much on 
the field of military interventions and foreign policies but more in trade, development and 
humanitarian assistance as a civilian actor. “The EU relies primarily on its soft power on the 
global stage” but with the continuous developments on the field of CFSP, it has managed to 
be seen with a different eye. 30   
After the Constitutional Treaty was abandoned by the EU, the constant story of reforming the 
structures of the foreign and security policy within the Union was crowned with the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This was a major step towards the establishment of a tough EU global identity, which 
despite its complexity has strengthened its international identity as an “actor with increased 
military capacities for implementation of its aims and objectives”. All this with the purpose 
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of enhancing the coherence of the EU as an actor on the international scene and strengthening 
its role on the field of CFSP. 31
One of the main changes brought by the reform treaty is that it gives the EU “a legal 
personality, therefore a formal status when it comes to enter in international agreements.”32
Furthermore the pillar structure of EU is dissolved, even that the status of CFSP will still be
different from other policies of the EU, because of the way decisions are taken and the level 
of involvement of states in this policy. Most importantly, two new institutions directly related 
to CFSP are created in the structure of the EU, the office of High representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service. 
This treaty completed the evolution of treaties on this field; the creation of the two new 
structures symbolized the abolishment of the pillars structure set in the Maastricht Treaty. 33
A new title is introduced (Title V) called Area of Freedom Security and Justice and 
thoroughly covers these matters. The new section 2 introduced provisions related to the 
common security and defense policy, with the specific aim of reforming this area. A special 
attention goes to supplying the Union with operational capacities “drawing on civilian and 
military assets provided by the Member States. This with the purpose of using them on 
missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security” Furthermore, Member States are obliged to make civilian and military 
capabilities available to the Union, but at the same time enhance their own military 
capacities. 
A further innovation brought by the reform treaty was the introduction of a mutual defense 
clause that was put within the text of the treaty (Art. 28 A (7) ToL). In this clause it is stated 
that if a Member State is victim of an armed aggression on its territory, “the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power.” Additionally, a ‘Solidarity Clause’ (Art. 222 TFEU) was added, obliging Member 
States to mutual solidarity in cases of terrorist attacks or natural and man-made disasters. “A 
similar commitment to mutual assistance even in the case of an armed aggression on the 
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territory of one of the Member States can be found in Art. 42 (7) TEU, in the framework of 
CSDP articles.”34
Changes occurred also regarding the Petersburg tasks which were finally recognized and now 
they include the “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post- conflict stabilization (art. 28b/ 
Article 43 (1) TEU). “These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism including 
supporting third states in combating terrorism. Finally political and military solidarity 
among EU Member States is in the Treaty via the inclusion of mutual assistance clause and 
solidarity clause.”35
This kind of reform can be seen with different views. Even with the effort that EU is making 
with these reforms in order to create a military and civilian structure within the EU and 
enhanced military capacities, it is uncertain how necessary this reform is. Even that clearly 
the Union needs to enhance its role on the international scene, and not be recognized only as 
a soft power, the readiness of the Member States to work as one in this field might not be a 
strong one. At the same time, an organization such as NATO serves more or less for the same 
purpose, just in a different scale, so how much can EU have an impact on these issues when it 
has USA and NATO on its side. A European identity is still not very strong within the people 
of Europe and most probably the nationals of EU Member States won’t be willing to die for a 
European ideal.
III. The Institutional Structure of CFSP
When looking at the legal basis of the institutional framework of the Union, Art. 3 of TEU 
states that the Union is endowed with a “single institutional framework”, "and underlines the 
principle of consistency in its external policies, for which the Commission and the Council
bear responsibility." According to Article 11 TEU, the goal of CFSP is to embrace the 
safeguarding of the “common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of 
the Union” as well as the development and consolidation of “democracy and the rule of law, 
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. "They serve as points of reference and 
guidelines for CFSP, to which all institutions are committed."36
The institutional structure of CFSP is a very complex one. This “institutional tree” that 
tackles this policy is comprised of four main European institutions and further smaller ones, 
who also play a very important role on defining and implementing CFSP. Four key 
institutions involved in CFSP are: the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council, the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Commission. Another 
European institution with an impact on CFSP is the European Parliament however its role 
remains limited. As regards the European Court of Justice, its role remains the same; it still 
has no jurisdiction on CFSP matters, with some exceptions. 
The European Council
As regards the role of the European Council it is quite dominant, generally in identifying 
policy goals and tackling particularly intractable issues.37 The European Council and its 
rotating presidency have always attracted the attention of media and the people. Its role has 
been identified as the voice of Europe and its decisions have been related to major 
developments in the international scene.38
Considering the fact that the European Council consists of the Heads of the State and 
Governments of the Member States, foreign ministers of the Member States, the President of
the Commission, one Commissioner, and the High Representative, is obvious that the role 
this institution has is quite significant. “The European Council is the locus of power within 
the European Union, if not legally then at least politically and symbolically.”39
As set on Article 4 of the TEU, the European Council has to provide the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development, and define the guidelines of its policies. Same applies 
as regards CFSP, the European Council has to define the principles and guidelines and decide 
on common strategies that will be implemented by the Union, and therefore no strategic 
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decision can be adopted without its consent. 40 As it can be seen, its role has not been 
modified compared to previous treaties. 
Even that from a political aspect, the meetings of the European Council are quite important, 
they can drive processes from a higher level and support decision-making directly from the 
Member States governmental levels, the European Council does not have a very substantial 
role when it comes to policy making. Usually the European Council endorses, confirms or 
welcomes most decisions on different issues taken by the Commission, the High 
Representative or the Presidency. 41
As any other politically composed body, the European Council makes vague declaration and 
its approaches are broad and general, so they can be understood from different angles on the 
future. Usually the members tend to keep a united opinion on different issues by trying to 
demonstrate the European spirit. However, in many other occasions it is here where the 
divergences between states are mostly shown, taking into consideration that the high state 
representatives defend their state views on sensitive issues more than in any other occasions, 
at the same time trying to win points within their states as well.42
The Foreign Affairs Council
After the Treaty of Lisbon, the General Affairs and External Relations Council is divided into 
two separate bodies, the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 16 (6) 
TEU). The General Affairs Council prepares the meetings of the European Council and is 
involved in foreign policy only in issues that are on the agenda of the European Council.  
Meanwhile, the Foreign Affairs Council (the Council) shall frame the CFSP and take the 
necessary decisions on operational action by the Union where the situation requires, thus 
binding Member States to commit those decisions.43 The work of the Council is closely 
related to other line institutions such as the Political and Security Committee, COREPER and 
also the European Defense Agency. These implement and monitor the execution of concrete 
decisions and policies taken in higher levels in practice.
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The European Commission
The Commission is the main institution of EU involved in all stages of policy making. This 
comes from its exclusive right of initiative (the Council and the EP can adopt legislative acts 
only on the basis of a formal proposal from the Commission). Furthermore, the 
Commission’s exclusive power of 'compiling soft law' gives it an important role.44
The Commissioners most directly involved in foreign policy rely on five Directorate Generals
and an Agency. Those Directorate Generals have their own set of objectives and instruments, 
and a legal basis in order to develop initiatives. The Directorates Generals involved in foreign 
policy making are the following: Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), 
Directorate General for Trade, Directorate General for Development, Directorate General for 
Enlargement, and Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and the European Aid 
Cooperation Office. Their role varies from "general coordination of external relations within 
the Commission" to the involvement in world trade issues and defending EUs position on 
these issues, helping developing countries and offering humanitarian aid when needed. 
However, the inevitable competition between those Directorates might be blamed for the 
difficulties of the Commission in defining and shaping the role of the Union on external 
relations.
As regards CFSP issues, the Directorate A of the DG Relex deals with Commissions 
coordination and contribution, Community aspects of the CFSP Joint Actions, sanctions, 
counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, disarmament, conflict prevention, Community 
contribution to crisis managements and any other CFSP aspects.45 Furthermore, the role of 
the Commission enhances when looking at the extensive network of delegations that it has 
throughout the world. Those 'embassies without a state' are the connection between the 
Commission and different states where they are located.46
In the area of foreign policy, the Commission has played a very important role. “Although its 
role on CFSP is quite distinct from its role in the EC, it is not as powerless as it might seem 
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on the first site when looking at the intergovernmental structure of the EU.”47 Considering 
that the EU budget falls within the scope of the competences of the Commission, its 
cooperation is needed when aiming to implement a CFSP policy. Both, the Commission and 
the Parliament want to impact this policy area when using their budgetary powers. 48
However, the budgeting of the EU foreign policy is a complex field that involves different 
procedures and mechanisms depending on the nature of the missions.49
The European Parliament 
The decision-making process within the EU and specifically within CFSP remains a very 
complex process and still an ‘intergovernmental’ one, even after the abolition of the pillar 
structure with the Lisbon Treaty.50  The limited role of the European Parliament and national 
parliaments can be easily grasped in the Lisbon Treaty. “A critical reading of the Lisbon 
Treaty suggests that CFSP remains largely out of parliamentary reach at the European level. 
The Lisbon Treaty kept CFSP a non-parliamentary field and refrained it from establishing a 
clear institutional understanding of inter-parliamentary cooperation. ” 51
In general, the field of security and defense is a sensitive one. Within national states there is a 
hesitation when facing the challenge to allow or grant competences of this field to 
supranational bodies. But at the same time, when looking at developments within national 
parliaments of the Member States or even any other state, the power over this policy belongs 
to the executive. “It is widely accepted that national parliaments are the prime institutions 
for controlling and legitimizing decision-making; but even in the national setting, foreign and 
security policy belongs to the executive sphere of action in which governments enjoy a 
comparatively high degree of autonomy and discretion.”52
“While the European Parliament can to some extent scrutinize the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘High Representative’), it does not have any 
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real possibilities to actually control the High Representative, let alone the Council.”53 .
However, the European Parliament has an extended liability when it comes to controlling the 
budget of EEAS and the parts of nonmilitary budget of CFSP. 54 Nevertheless the impact of 
the European Parliament on CFSP leaves much to be desired. It might be considered that the 
Parliament has some sort of a significant role only over budget of non-military CFSP 
missions, however considering that Member States can supply additional funds to cover their 
own costs, the European Parliament cannon set a ceiling of expenditure. Considering all what 
is said above, the impact that the European Parliament has on CFSP is hard to be considered 
as any power.
To sum up, the European Parliament can manage to influence foreign policies of EU through 
having the chance of blocking the budget, since the budget for CFSP has to go through 
regular budgetary procedures of the EC, that being a long and complicated procedure. On the 
other hand, a different financial mechanism applies to CFSP operations with military or 
defense implications. These operations are financed by the Member States, and mainly the 
ones that participate in the military operation in question.55
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
The newly most important institutional arrangement brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 18 TEU). The role 
of the High Representative is to “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action” (Art. 
18 (4) TEU) in giving it a ‘single voice’ and ‘face’.56 The High Representative is appointed 
by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the consent of the President of 
the Commission. Important to notice is the fact that she is also subject to a vote of consent by 
the European Parliament. This position is being held by Baroness Catherine Ashton, and it 
“combines the three hats of “[conducting] the Union’s common foreign and security policy”, 
“[presiding] over the Foreign Affairs Council” and as “one of the Vice-Presidents of the 
Commission” she is “responsible within the Commission for the responsibilities incumbent 
on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action”. 57
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Despite the similarity of titles between the previous high representative and after the Lisbon 
Treaty high representative, the new position was designed with the purpose of improving EUs
foreign policy and external security policy co-ordination by merging the existing post of the 
Commissioner for External Relations and the Council’s High Representative.58
Based on Articles 18 and 27 of the TEU, the High Representative has the following main 
duties: conducting the Union's CFSP and contributing to the development of such policy, and 
at the same time ensuring the implementation of the decisions adopted in this field.59 When 
talking about her roles, one cannot hide the envy to their importance and power. She presides 
over the Foreign Affairs Council; she is one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and 
ensures the consistency of the Union's external action. She represents the Union in CFSP 
matters and conducts political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and expresses 
the Union's position in international organizations. Furthermore, her role is equal of a foreign 
minister of a state considering that she exercises authority over the European External Action 
Service and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations.60
The new High Representative had quite a challenge when taking this post. Considering that 
EUs foreign policy was a weak one, thus when the big calls needed to be made it was the big 
powers that set the agenda. “Britain and France used their military power - with a lot of help 
from America - to oust Libya's Colonel Gaddafi. When it comes to Russia it is the Germans 
who have the special relationship. And on matters which relate to their export markets - like 
China - the Germans scarcely cast a glance at Brussels.”61 Even with all the challenges and 
the taken criticism it is worthy to mention that Ms. Ashton is one of the most highly paid 
women’s in the world, “as a Commissions’ vice-president Baroness Ashton receives a basic 
annual salary of about 265,470 euros - and on top of that various EU allowances. In contrast, 
the UK prime minister gets about £142,500 (167,500 euros).”62 This being in contradiction 
with the budget that the institution she directs receives. Certainly the new post answered the 
famous question of Henry Kissinger. 
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Ashton is also trying to fill the gaps of the ESPD, with the aim of making up the deficiencies 
and changing the perception of the people for this policy through her work. As it has been 
mentioned, one of the main points where this policy lacks legitimacy it’s the relation with the 
European Parliament. Ashton has been trying to build a stronger relationship by responding 
to the queries and recommendations of the European Parliament. At the same time she has 
been taking into consideration parliamentarians in initiatives of improving relations in the 
neighborhood countries, therefore the Parliament will also pay off this inclusion by helping in 
increasing the funding for the EEAS. 63
On the other hand, she has been receiving a lot of criticism since the beginning of her work. 
The new post of High Representative includes many tasks such as chairing the FAC for CFSP 
and CFSP, leading the foreign policy of EU, managing EU’s aid budget and heading EEAS. 
As the first High Representative, Ashton had to deal with troubles of the commencement
such as setting the staff and functioning of EEAS and create open arrangements for policy 
areas overlapping with areas of foreign policy where the Commission also has a powerful 
role (such as development, energy, climate change and enlargement policies).64 Ashton has 
been criticized for her poor chairing of FAC and not being involved sufficiently in security 
matters, or for not participating in enough meetings of the College of Commissioners, or 
traveling to world troubled spots.65 However, Ashton has been highly engaged when it comes 
to political dialogue, she has been chairing the negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, a 
task which could also be her redemption and a chance to leave a mark on the history. 
European External Action Service 
The European External Action Service (hereinafter EEAS) was established by the Treaty of 
Lisbon and was formally launched on 1st of December 2010. Its legal basis can be found in 
Article 27 of TEU, where it is mentioned for the first time. The main task of EEAS is to assist 
the High Representative to fulfill his or her mandate, and that it shall work ‘in cooperation’ 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. 66 So the EEAs can be seen as a 
complementary body to the High Representative, set out very elegantly on the legal 
framework. Moreover, once again can be seen the intergovernmental and multilevel structure 
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of EU institutions, when considering that the staff of the EEAS compiles of staff from the 
General Secretariat of the Council, of the Commission and of national diplomatic services of 
the Member States. The EEAS is a sui generis institution and has also the privilege of having 
its own budget section within the EU budget.67
During 2012, the administrative budget of EEAS was €489 million, or a measly 0.31 per cent 
of the total EU budget of €147.2 billion (around one per cent of EU GDP). The EEAS has 
asked for an increase of €27.9 million in 2013, bringing it to €516.9 million, from a total 
budget of €150 billion (of which €9.5 billion is spent on foreign policy). Considering that it’s 
role resembles to the one of a foreign ministry, if we compare its budget to other foreign 
ministries it can be noted that in 2012 the EEAS budget was around “half that of the UK 
FCO, the Quai d’Orsay or the Auswärtiges Amt, and 6.6 per cent of what the EU-27 
collectively spent on their foreign ministries in 2009 (€7.5 billion). Looking across the 
Atlantic, the US State Department spends twelve times more than the EEAS.”68 Apparently, if 
EU wants to compete with strong powers of the world in the field of defense and security, it 
has to invest more on its capacities. 
This sort of a consular and diplomatic body that serves a sui generis institutional building 
system like the European one resembles to a sui generis organization. The perception for the 
EEAS remains weak and in my opinion, it seems more like a body that tries to be perceived 
as a common diplomatic body of the Union, however it is unrealistic the belief that Member 
States like UK or France will delegate their diplomatic powers and privileges to such a young 
body. 
Even that EEAS can be considered as a recently created institution, it has already started to 
show its success but at the same time its deficiencies. EEAS has a role in 2011 in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, where it assisted the establishment of a new neighborhood 
policy under “which access to EU markets, visas and money would depend on evidence of a 
commitment to democratic reforms (the ‘more for more’ approach)”.69
This sort of reaction and plan to a crisis was welcomed and it was considered as a change on 
the EU’s politics of ‘Arab exceptionalism’ ” which had previously seen repressive regimes 
such as Ben Ali’s in Tunisia gain extensive access to EU funds and markets. A new concept 
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for the neighborhood was widely welcomed, even if some complain that its implementation 
lacked consistency.” 70
Understandably the large Member States for a long time have been unwilling to share their 
powers or “delegate responsibility to the EU for most of their diplomatic relations with major 
powers such as the United States or the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India or China).”71  
The big European Member States enjoy a great relationship with these countries and they 
hesitate to sacrifice their reputation or their privileges for the common foreign policy of the 
Union. Especially this comes into the scene in cases of France and the UK, who enjoy a 
permanent membership status at the UN Security Council, a privilege that not many countries 
have and it would be non-sense to give up for the status of a single EU representation. 72
More seats mean a stronger voice, either for the EU as a whole, and either for these countries 
as neighbors. “Even Germany prefers to lobby for its own seat on an expanded Security 
Council than for a single EU seat. “73
IV. Internal difficulties in CFSP
Being a policy area comprised by a system of intergovernmental decision making but at the 
same time tangled in a trans-governmental network of multiply levels, CFSP remains an 
uncertain one. Member States are responsible for the final decisions on this policy area; they 
coordinate their actions taking into consideration views and interest of third countries and 
within the framework of UN. 74 Meanwhile the role of the European Parliament in the 
decision making process related to this policy remains vague. In this chapter, two main points 
will be explained, on one hand, how the Member States control CFSP through the decision 
making procedures, and on the other hand, what is the main impact that the Parliament has on 
this policy. Even that in a democratic society decisions should be taken with a high impact of 
the will of people of that society that is not the case in CFSP. It has already been stated that 
EU is a sui generis organization, the decision making procedures differ from the ones that 
states have, or even procedures that are used in other policies. The role of the EP will be 
analyzed as regards the decision making procedures on CFSP.
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Provisions regarding CFSP are foreseen on Title V of the TEU. The competences are mainly 
divided by the European Council and the Council, where depending on the situation the 
decisions can be taken either unanimously or with qualified majority voting (hereinafter 
QMV). In cases of operational action, decisions are adopted by the Council (Article 28/ ex 
Article 14 TEU). Furthermore, in Article 31 (ex Article 23 TEU) it is set that the decisions 
regarding this policy shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously, except where is provided otherwise. The treaty provisions on decision making 
procedures are quite complex. “The refusal to extend QMV to decisions over war and peace 
is consistent with a version of realism emphasizing autonomy but if states seek to increase 
their collective power and influence in international politics, then the unwillingness of some 
EU member states to give up external sovereignty in foreign and security affairs is outright 
self-defeating.”75
Beside, the basic rules of decision making with QMV or unanimity, the treaties have foreseen 
two additional procedures: Constructive abstention or limitations to QMV derogations.76 In 
the constructive abstention procedure (second paragraph of the Article) an ‘escape from 
responsibility’ is foreseen. In this provision is stated that if a member of the Council is 
abstaining a vote, it may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration …and it shall 
not be obliged to apply the decision and shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or 
impede Unions action based on that decision. Taking into consideration the powers of the big 
Member States and the ones of the small ones, this provision is a way a state could escape 
from the responsibility of a CFSP decision. Without prejudging, sometimes the small states 
want to agree and at the same time be neutral to different issues, so this is a perfect chance for 
them to simply abstain from a decision, not apply it but at the same time not contradict the 
main powers of the Union. Even that another provision in the same article gives a more 
‘democratic’ sense to the whole issue (“If the members of the Council qualifying their 
abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least 
one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted” (Article 23, 
TEU), it would be useful to know if this is a provision that has ever been applied in real. 
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The other complex procedure has to do with limitations to QMV derogations meaning that 
QMV does not apply to decisions with military or defense implications. In this sense, 
Member States can block decisions with military of defense implications however; there is 
another procedure that facilitates the policy making in cases where EU cannot act as a whole: 
enhanced cooperation.77 “Article 27 TEU states that Member States which wish to establish 
enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive 
competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those competences by applying the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties, however even in this case, matters with military or 
defense implications are excluded.”78
From what is explained above and including the “the absence of parliamentary control of the 
executive bodies at the EU level; and, the fact that, increasingly, since the 1986 Single 
European Act, government representatives could be outvoted by a qualified majority in the 
Council of Ministers; “a lack of legitimacy is present on the EU decision making procedures. 
Furthermore, considering that the integration process creates a democratic deficit within the 
Member States since they will no longer be able to answer to their popular demands, there is 
a mismatch between the requests of their citizens and what their state is able to give them. 79
Certainly the treaties foresee a number of different procedures regarding the decision-
making/policy-making in the CFSP, thus Member States can use different instruments either 
in favor of the aim they want to reach, either against that aim. The procedures foreseen by the 
treaties seem to regulate very well different situations of decision making, however these 
treaty provisions can be misleading. Some of these procedures are foreseen in the text of the 
treaties but because of their complexity they have never been put in practice or are irrelevant 
for the decision making procedures. Such is the case with enhanced cooperation or 
constructive abstention.80
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The limited powers of the European Parliament
In the context of this paper, the main issue would be how legitimate this policy is. In the 
preface of this paper it was stated that legitimacy is directly related to the power of the 
people, so how much the people of Europe in any way have any impact on this policy. 
For a Parliament in order to exercise its rights of legitimacy it should have the possibility to 
formulate its positions on different proposals and be able to approve or reject what the 
executive has proposed. In the case of the European Parliament there are currently five main 
legal procedures: simple procedure, (where the parliament is not involved at all), 
consultation, co-operation, co-decision and assent. However, in the case of CFSP the EU 
Parliament cannot make use of any of these options, since CFSP is primarily 
intergovernmental and it is characterized by a specific nature.81 Article 36 (ex Article 21 
TEU) sets the ‘consulting’ procedures with the European Parliament and it ensures that the 
views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Therefor the impact of 
the European Parliament on CFSP leaves much to be desired. It might be considered that the 
Parliament has some sort of a significant role only over budget of non-military CFSP 
missions, yet considering that Member States can supply additional funds to cover their own 
costs, the Parliament cannon set a ceiling of expenditure. Considering all what is said above, 
the impact that the European Parliament has on CFSP is hard to be considered as any power. 
The main role that the European Parliament has on CFSP “is some control over the budget of 
non-military CFSP missions. But while the Parliament monitors the CFSP budget for civilian 
missions, Member States may choose to supply additional funding to cover their own 
personnel costs, so in fact the European Parliament cannot set the ceiling on expenditure 
even for a civilian mission. Military operations are financed by the Athena mechanism 
whereby a fund of contributions proportional to gross national income meets core costs, and 
the contributing member states pay for operational expenditure on the basis of ‘costs lie 
where they fall’, a mechanism which is widely criticized as inadequate.” Athena might be 
considered as a sui generis mechanism that administers the financing of the EU military or 
defence operations, the so called common costs. This mechanism was established by the 
Council of the EU on 1st of March 2004 and it is based on Councils Decision 2011/871/CFSP 
of 19 December 2011 to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union 
operations having military or defence implications (Athena). It is set on article 41.2 of the 
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TEU that, Member States' contributions to ATHENA should be based on the Gross National 
Income scale. “Concretely, Member States pay their annual share based on the size of their 
economy.”82
Even though, when it comes to expenditures the importance of the role of the European 
Parliament relatively changes. The expenditures of this policy are charged to the Union 
budget, except for the ones that rise from operations having military or defense implications 
and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. 83 “In cases where 
expenditure is not charged to the Union budget it shall be charged to the Member States in 
accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council decides otherwise. As 
for expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications, Member 
States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 
III-300(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing 
thereof.”84
Certainly might be gloomy the fact that the only way the representative of the people can 
affect such an important policy for the Union is through the ‘money’. To sum up, we might 
conclude that the European Parliament can manage to “manipulate” policies of EU through 
having the chance of blocking the budget since the budget for CFSP has to go through regular 
budgetary procedures of the EC, that being a long and complicated procedure. On the other 
hand a different financial mechanism applies to CFSP operations with military or defense 
implications. These operations are financed by the Member States, and mainly the ones that 
participate in the military operation in question.85
As it can be seen the whole decision making procedure on CFSP is a complex one. There are 
a lot of actors involved, some with stronger voices and some with weaker ones. This might be 
seen in a positive sense; the ability to have a lot of voices might bring different perspectives 
and assist in taking the right decisions. However in practice this is not how things always 
happen. It is left to the future to be seen how much of a common foreign policy 28 Member 
States can develop.
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V. The External Difficulties of CFSP
When acting on the global scene, either as a soft power or a military one, EU faces various 
challenges. During different events through the last century, EU has been considered as a 
political dwarf in times of crisis, especially military ones. The main roles on areas of civilian 
or military crisis remain to the US or NATO. Therefore, besides facing internal difficulties, 
EU continues to have external ones as well. The main issues are its duplication of powers 
with NATO and the ongoing competition with the US. Even nowadays, the role of NATO is 
getting smaller and smaller and the US remains the biggest actor in this field. 
As regards the duplication of roles with NATO, various arguments can go on favor of a 
stronger European CFSP. Within EU there was a range of opinions and views as regarding 
the relationship between the CFSP and NATO. Naturally, when looking at their tasks, they 
kind of overlap each other, and this brought the EU Member States in dubious situations. 
From one side there were extreme cases of countries such as Denmark that believes that the 
only structure that should deal with this sort of issues is NATO, however on the other side 
there are countries like Finland or Ireland that traditionally have refused to be associated with 
NATO.86 The United Kingdom is considered to be one of the most Atlanticist states, however 
Germany, the Netherlands or Portugal also are not left behind. Therefore “NATO remains a 
fundamental reference for these countries, all of which continue to do battle to keep the 
Alliance as alive and relevant as possible.”87
“Safeguarding NATO as the forum for implementing the collective defense of its Member 
States appears to aim at avoiding duplication.”88 This once again sets a way for EU to escape 
from military implications, considering that most of EU Member States are also member 
states of NATO. Furthermore, with the Lisbon reforms there were innovations in these areas. 
A mutual defense clause was introduced, giving states the chance to intervene in order to 
assist each other. However, there are no arrangements provided for the implementation of the 
aforementioned mutual assistance clause, therefore “assuming that the neutral Member States 
are exempted from the mutual assistance clause (see above), this leaves Malta and Cyprus in 
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a peculiar position: if they are attacked, an ad hoc implementation of the mutual assistance 
clause would appear as the only solution available. Likewise, their assistance to EU Member 
States which are also Members of NATO and which are attacked would have to be arranged 
on an ad hoc basis”89
Nevertheless it is obvious that there was a dose of skepticism of the Member States regarding 
a common security policy that was much related with the role of NATO as well. After all, 
why duplicate the roles and spend money and energy in structures that already exist in a 
different level. This question is easily answered, first because if EU wants to be a global 
actor, it should have more than words to put on the table. Recently NATO “is losing
relevance and has ceased to preserve its traditional function of serving as a framing structure 
that keeps the allies on track. “90 Second because EU cannot allow situations like the ones in 
Kosovo or Bosnia ever to be repeated. Third, because EU already has a legislative framework 
that regulates these structures, and even that there is a lack of legitimacy within the structures 
of this policy, that can be regulated through reforms increasing the parliamentary 
involvement within the decision-making process.
On the other hand, ideas and points of view during the last decade of the last century started 
to change. It was certainly the “crisis in Bosnia that marked the most damning commentary 
on the lack of European solidarity and their ability to formulate common approaches on 
foreign and security related issues. Ironically, it was on major transatlantic differences that 
the Europeans appeared to find most solidarity, such as the maintenance of the Bosnian arms 
embargo in the face of Congressional opposition. The crisis also illustrated how dependent 
the European allies are upon U.S. initiative and leadership and, when it comes to military 
action, NATO remains the only serious actor.91 The wars on Yugoslavia were described by 
“the German chancellor Helmuth Kohl as “Europe’s shame” because the EU failed to 
respond appropriately to end the fighting and crimes against humanity. The EU had neither 
political nor military capacities to react to a problem of such proportions.” 92
The same continues with the current situations. NATO’s days are numbered and that Kosovo 
was the last American war in Europe, furthermore it is obvious that the US are willing  and 
have the capability to fight (like in Afghanistan and Iraq) without support of the NATO. “The 
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bon mot of the hour is that the US has started to view NATO as being not more than a 
“toolbox”93, or to use another metaphor: NATO comes in as the “cleaning lady” for the 
Americans, after the US army has engaged in the real important job of high intensity 
combat.” 94 If this statement really stands, than it might be considered necessary for the EU as 
well to have its own role on the world and not rely on a second based world power that 
NATO is becoming.
Even that the cooperation with NATO is not specifically mentioned on the Treaties, this does 
not preclude the fact that there is a close cooperation between EU and NATO. Furthermore, 
the relationship between the EU and NATO is a key element on EUs foreign policy given the 
growing perseverance to deploy military forces and the need for hi-tech military equipment 
and transportation capacities.95 At the same time, even if NATO is not mentioned by name in 
the treaties, there is a provision stating that ‘[t]he Union shall also maintain such relations as 
are appropriate with other international organizations’. Moreover, NATO presumably 
qualifies as an organization which shares the principles on which the EU is based and with 
which the EU shall, by virtue of article III-292(1), ‘seek to develop relations and build 
partnerships’.96 From the institutional point of view there is also a link between the European 
Parliament and NATO. Ten parliamentarians of the European Parliament represent the 
Delegation for the relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the NATO.97
Though, this abovementioned relationship might be more theoretical than practical. Issues 
between EU and NATO on the area of foreign policy continue even after the 2002 Berlin plus 
agreement “which regulates the cooperation between both organizations and which 
essentially declares the EU to be NATO’s junior partner in all matters security, the EU could 
potentially use NATO military assets if not vetoed by any NATO member.”98 But in this 
matter, Turkey continues to be a problem. Most of the attempts of cooperation between 
NATO and EU are vetoed by Turkey “which does not diplomatically recognize the Republic 
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of Cyprus (an EU member) and will thus not accept any EU-NATO cooperation of which that 
country is part of.”99
As regards this “external difficulty”, to sum up we can conclude that it is essential that EU 
develops its own security policy. The same argument goes for another issue that EU deals 
with, its role on the global stage vis-a-vi US. It is important to note that US has always been 
one of the most active players on the international scene when it comes to crisis intervention. 
However, it should be given importance to the fact that not necessarily the EU will always 
agree with the US opinion regarding these crises. EU should continue to improve its 
capacities, either military or civilian if it still wants to have a say on the global stage. If these 
kinds of ideas and decision will be legitimate, that does not seem to bring much debate 
nowadays.  For instance, the attack of NATO on the Kosovo war in 1999 was ‘illegal, but 
legitimate’ and it was treated like that because of compelling moral reasons such as imminent 
threat of humanitarian catastrophe; regional European consensus; overwhelming Kosovar 
political consensus—except a small Serbian minority—relating to self-determination; Serb 
record of criminality in Bosnia and Kosovo100. 
EU has always been recognized as a soft power and US dealt with the military parts. “While 
this kind of division of labor would have the advantage for the Europeans of being released 
from the obligation of building up an effective and costly European army, the Europeans 
would be well advised not to give up on this project: a strong Europe is urgently needed to 
act as a counterweight to the United States and as a constraint to its uncontrolled use 
of military power.” 101 EU has been always considered as a model of a stable and peaceful 
zone, always taking most of her interest towards global initiatives and challenges that are not 
of a less importance but let’s say do not require military capacities to deal with, such as 
climate change.  The EU remains as the main provider of soft security in the global area and 
plays an important stabilizing role. This was foreseen by the treaties and conventions and it 
was seen as a value that defined the European foreign policy. Its principles involved 
                                                            
99 http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2010/06/PolDi-Asien_Panorama_02-2010/Panorama_2-
2010_SecurityPolitics_Techau.pdf p.83
100 Contra Syria Attack, 30 August 2013, http://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2013/08/30/contra-syria-attack/
101 Supra 11, p. 35
28
institutional sets and civil institutions such as human rights, representative democracy and the 
rule of law.102
This might be understood considering the fact that the EU lacks an internal foreign policy 
consensus which also affects the definition of the EU’s global role. 103 This lack of consensus 
and common standings within the 28 Member States is also reflected when it comes to 
common decisions in foreign policy, especially ones with military implications. “The lacks of 
consensus among the Member States plays into the US strategy of a “Europe of the grand 
nations” (according to President Bush) and undermines the Europeans’ strive for a global 
role to balance US influence. The Iraq crisis has revealed already that the cohesion in 
foreign policy (in its three dimensions) will be more difficult with 25 members than with 15 
members”.104
These arguments suggest that in general, the internal issues of CFSP most of the time are 
reflected on its external action. Therefore, EU keeps facing internal and external issues when 
attempting to emerge with a stronger foreign and security policy. However the main 
argument remains the same, it is essential for EU to develop a stronger CFSP and go beyond 
these difficulties if it wants to have a stronger power on the global stage.
VI. CFSP Mission or Missing in Action
The external difficulties that EU faces on the area of security have also been proofed in 
practice. A case that has been intertwined with CFSP throughout all the phases of its 
development is the case of Kosovo. Worth mentioning that it is not the only case where EU 
has failed to give support, even within the broader European borders, however it is a good 
one considering the continuity of events. The role of EU in crisis that happened within its 
natural borders was minor and that left place for concerns. It is important to note the efforts 
that EU made after these crises in the Balkans to improve its role on the field of defense and 
security.
Just like in Bosnia, the role of EU was minor during Kosovo crisis. A Community 
Monitoring Mission was established (ECMM) and since 1996 twenty-two declarations, 
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decisions or Joint Actions have been passed within the CFSP framework relating to 
Kosovo.105 Another measure by the EU was the economic sanctions towards Serbian assets 
overseas and also an embargo was putted on the export of arms to former Yugoslavia. 
In general, the case of Bosnia from 1991 and the one of Kosovo are quite similar. In both 
cases diplomacy was largely unsuccessful and military capabilities had to intervene. This fact 
reduced dramatically the effectiveness of the powers of an EU Member States in an armed 
conflict since in both cases it was the US, the only power who could do something about the 
situation, something over diplomacy. All that EU could offer were statements of Heads of 
States and Government enhancing “the necessity of an active role for the European Union in 
overcoming the crisis” and looking toward the role they could have on post-conflict 
settlements.106
In spring 1999, it was the NATOs air campaign raged over Serbia that forced Milosevic to 
agree with a peace settlement that was offered to him by the allies. “To compensate for the 
Europeans’ lack of aircraft and missiles, the US had to take the lion’s share of the burden 
and flew over 60% of the total missions, accounting for more than 80% of the weapons 
delivered.”107 However, the Europeans disagreed with this kind of strategy that relied on air 
power with the reasoning that it involved too many risks on hitting civilian buildings and that 
this kind of strategy was “wrong” because it targeted civilian buildings in order to threaten 
and weaken Milosevic. “Consequently the United States concluded from this war episode that 
never again would they wage a war in collaboration with the Europeans, who had nothing to 
contribute other than complicating the decision-making process on how to wage the war.”108
These kinds of strategic disagreements made Europeans to think again over their policies and 
urged the need to build up a European security structure which would enable them to solve 
the next European crisis without US interference. “Thus, it seems the war in Kosovo served 
as a catalyst for the eventual creation of an autonomous European defense structure.”109
Kosovo’s case is certainly a stepping stone on the history of CFSP. This is a close example of 
how much a European army is needed, and it should be the reasoning behind the people who 
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refuse military capabilities, or hesitate to invest on them. If we already have the legal basis, 
why not try to invest on them and go beyond the soft power. But the same questions keep 
arising, is it what the people of Europe really want? How democratic it is to just decide over 
these issues, investing in military capabilities or even deciding to get involved in a military 
mission if the decisions will be taken in a high level of government, away from the voices of 
the people, when there is a lack of legitimacy and democratic processes regarding this issue.  
If we compare with US, then most probably there as well will be found negative voices 
regarding war there as well, however the attachment that the Americans have to their state is 
nowhere close the one that a European citizen has to Europe. 
Maybe the case of Kosovo was the lesson learned for EU and for the negative voices towards
common military capabilities. Even that Member States hesitate to create a common 
European army, it was obvious that there are still cases when that would be necessary and 
that soft power is not sufficient. The truth is that the EU leaders held their word regarding 
interventions after the armed conflict, the largest ESDP civilian mission ever launched is in 
Kosovo. When comparing the budget allocated to different CFSP missions with EULEX, its 
importance its quite clear. For the EUFOR mission in Bosnia, EU has allocated € 23 million, 
for the one in Lybia €7.9 million, meanwhile for EULEX it has allocated €165 million.
EULEX, as the largest civilian mission of EU, has as a main aim to assist and support 
Kosovo authorities in the area of rule of law, and specifically on the judiciary. By the end of 
2011 EULEX had a staff of 1550 international members and 1176 of local ones. On its 
mandate it is defined that it “shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in 
further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-
ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political 
interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best 
practices.”110
Its overall budget and the large number of staff have increased expectations both among the 
local population and among the policy makers in Brussels and the EU Member States.”111
The ambitious aims of the mission to fight corruption and organized crime in Kosovo have 
increased the expectations of the peoples within the country that EULEX will deal with issues 
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that local institutions are not trusted to deal with anymore.112 However these expectations are 
failing to be met, these sorts of problems remain in a very high scale in the country and it is 
still unclear if the expectations were too high or once again EU is failing to comply with its 
missions. 
Nevertheless, when talking about EULEX legitimacy, within Kosovo there is not much space 
for doubt. EULEX’s presence is legally and practically justified by referring to the 
Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo, the Ahtisaari and the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosovo. Furthermore EULEX operates based on the initial Joint Action 
which too was endorsed by Kosovo’s President in her invitation to the High Representative.
113 Deciding on what to look for when analyzing legitimacy is a challenging undertaking due 
to the concept’s elusive nature. To guide the analysis in this paper, local legitimacy is 
understood as “an institutional attribute through which actors accept the authority of an 
institution as justified because it conforms to their individually and collectively held norms 
and value”.114
Even that the EULEX mission can be considered as legitimate, there is a lack of democratic 
accountability of this mission. It can be understood that being a foreign mission, it does not 
have to give accountability to institutions of a state, however considering that Kosovo is 
already an independent state, and the issues that EULEX is involved with are state issues, 
then some kind of parliamentary control should have been available. Even that in the 
beginning this mission was expected with a huge enthusiasm, either because it came from 
“outside” as a way of salvation, or because of the impact it had as an ESDP mission, those 
hopes and expectations are getting every day and smaller. EULEX “in many cases has 
managed to prevent political pressure being waged on judicial and other independent 
institutions, challenging local impunity and these kind of cases are the only ones when and 
where the mission personnel were present.”115 However, there have been cases of pressure 
coming from EULEX itself, so if there is a lack of control or any kind of accountability from 
this mission, the famous question comes into the scene, who guards the guardians?
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In general the work of this mission is evaluated as one that leaves a lot to be desired. 
EULEX’s staff presence in all the necessary institutions and cases has been weak and its 
mandate on ensuring rule of law has stagnated on its way. 
As for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, needless to say it had to be postponed until a government 
was formed and it could only be initiated as from 8th March 2011. “The aim was to normalise 
relations between the two countries, both of which aspire to EU membership, in the context of 
Serbia's continued refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence”.116 Ms. Ashton mediated 
more than 12 rounds of talks between the two countries. 
“It was on April 19, 2013 when an agreement was reached that some coined historic while 
others called it a huge breakthrough.” 117 This agreement came as a result of long 
negotiations, processes and debates. Even that it certainly was an important moment on their 
history, this agreement is the first of many more to come, a pessimist would read that “this is 
a first agreement on principles, not on a given matter”118 Nevertheless, both states have 
strong incentives to continue sealing the deal, Serbia is every day and closer to European 
integration and Kosovo needs a lot of support and acceptance in the international sphere. 
In the sense of CFSP, this might be considered a success story for Ms. Ashton, who is 
facilitating the negotiations between the two countries. She has been working with a great 
dedication towards this reconciliation, and following 13 hours long meetings between prime 
ministers of two countries. The reasoning might be a clear one, just like Serbia and Kosovo 
can benefit on their integration to EU from these negotiations; they might be a salvation for 
Ms. Ashton as well. Considering its long history and all that has been invested in the new 
structures of CFSP, a sign of success is needed and apparently Ms. Ashton has decided this to 
be the political momentum of her success and her mark on the history. "I've heard the word 
historic," stated she to the BBC. "And maybe, looking back, that is how people will view 
it."119 If these negotiations succeed, once again it would be a proof that EU can succeed with 
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soft power, but well, let’s hope history won’t bring chances so that EU can “try” their 
military capabilities (even that crises in different parts of the world keep arising). 
VII. Conclusion
Considering all that was mentioned above, two points shall be concluded in this paper. First 
of all, since EU is a sui generis political order, this has profound implications for its 
legitimacy and it should be considered whether the standards of legitimacy that apply to 
liberal democratic states should be applied in the case of the EU as well. 120 Second, it should 
be considered whether CFSP is one of the cases where the goal justifies the means. The 
importance of strengthening the (military) role of EU on the global scene will be the second 
point elaborated.
Legitimacy is directly related to whether citizens have trust in “the future compliance of other 
citizens and authorities with institutions they believe to be normatively deserving of 
obedience. Indeed, trustworthiness seems crucial for the long-term support of the EU’s 
multilevel political order, and for the authorities’ ability to govern.” 121 Furthermore, bearing 
in mind that parliaments should have an essential political importance since they are directly
elected by the people and they are the core of legitimacy in democratic systems122, in the case 
of CFSP the role of the Parliament can hardly be considered power. There is clearly a lack of 
democratic legitimacy in CFSP.  
On the other hand, with regard to the second point, taking into consideration the importance 
of strengthening the role of EU in the international scene on the area of defense and security 
policies, a check and balances analysis would tell if it is worth it. One of these points is the 
analysis on, whether EU should continue relying on its soft power, or should develop and 
intervene with military capacities. At the same time, this relates with the “strong” role of the 
US on these matters, how much EU should continue to rely on US when it comes to taking 
standings on the field of foreign policy.
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The need to develop a common foreign and security policy and the will of the Member States 
to intervene in crisis around the world should be taken into consideration. As regards the EU 
as a soft power, its role is already established in the global scene, meanwhile as regards the 
military implications, it is still uncertain. However, this kind of soft power cannot be seen as 
a “useless one”. As it has been seen in the cases of Western Balkans, Middle East and 
Afghanistan, the civilian aspect of a crisis management mission also has a crucial role, since 
a naked military power can often lead to failure. The civilian crisis management is a new 
developed concept that involves a broad range of instruments and a great degree of 
institutional flexibility considering that it involves all the three agencies of the pillars of 
TEU.123 It will always be more useful to have a combination of both, the civilian and the 
military aspect. But in the case of EU it is harder to define and compel a military aspect, 
considering EU as a sui generis “organization”. 
Probably most of the EU Member States prefer to be involved in civilian management 
mission than in military ones. Even that they continue and try to invest in a military aspect of 
CFSP, is it really on the "nature" of EU to answer things by violence? This might be a very 
naive approach however in the territory of hundred and thousand years of evolution from 
wars and reconciliation, most probably a peaceful approach would be the "voice" of the 
people. And once again we go back to the point of leaving the tough "dirty" parts to the USA.
Though to the question rising, if illegal but legitimate (and the other way around) attacks 
should be used as precedent on the future, there are multiply answers. This was aiming to be 
used as a precedent on the case of Syria, however there are a lot of circumstances that should 
be double checked before taking such a decision. This is where the global powers will always 
have their clashes, which brings us back to the point. EU should enhance its foreign and 
defense capabilities in order to have a say when it comes to intervening on troubled zones. 
Humanitarian catastrophes should not be allowed to happen ever again but at the same time, 
military actions cannot be used to fulfill the interests of a state, no matter if they are legal or 
legitimate. 
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